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 Nations without the distinct legal status of statehood have become increasingly important in the 
domestic politics of some European countries. Recent secession referenda in various countries (most 
notably Spain and the United Kingdom) have highlighted this trend. This study examines the impact that 
sub-state national identities have on the disbursement of intergovernmental transfer payments in two 
unitary states: the Netherlands and Spain. These cases were selected to conduct a “most different 
systems” analysis and examined transfers from the central governments to their respective highest levels 
of regional governance in the period between 2010 and 2018.  
 Established theory on the interaction between identity and institutions supports the hypothesis 
that regions with more distinct separate identities will receive preferential treatment from their state 
governments than those without. This study used support for sub-state nationalist parties as a proxy 
measure for relative strength of their respective identities, which combined with the independent fiscal 
capacity of the regions was regressed against the amount of transfers received to understand any 
relationship that might exist.  
 The results of the analysis of these variables indicates that although they are more effective 
predictors in Spain, there is a significant positive relationship in both countries between sub-state national 
identities and intergovernmental transfer payments. Individual analysis of the Netherlands found that, 
counter to established theory on intergovernmental transfers, regions with higher fiscal capacities also 
received more transfers from the government. Analysis of Spain found that, with a couple of notable 
exceptions, regions with higher degrees of sub-state nationalism received more transfers from the central 
government.  This study fills gaps in the literature that previously did not specifically examine the 
relationships between these variables and highlights some areas for future study, both at smaller case-
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.1 – Key Terms and Scope 
One key premise of a state, and subsequently the international system as a whole, is the 
existence of distinct national identities. Occasionally denominated as nation-state, this term is 
largely synonymous with the shortened "state" label. The terms are often interchangeable given 
that virtually all current states have (though to varying degrees) national identities associated 
with them. An important distinction comes when the words are separated. A state is a legal entity 
which has the ability to exercise sovereignty over a permanent population within a well-defined 
territory.1  A nation, however, is a common group identity which may or may not have a bearing 
on the legal entity within which that group resides. Simply put, a state is a legal entity based on 
the people and territory under its control, and a nation (or national identity) is a group of people 
who identify themselves based on a common ethnicity, culture, or occasionally language.2 A 
group of people, for example Indigenous peoples of Canada or Kurdish people in the Middle 
East, may belong to a nation which does not have legal status as a state. This is considered a 
"non-state" or "sub-state" nation, which is the focus of this study.3  
The concept of sub-state nationalism is extremely important in Europe. Its long history of 
conflicts and malleable borders combined with the sheer number of sub-state national identities 
make it a prime example for academic study. Though many states in Europe have undergone 
transitions in and out of democracy, the sub-states nations have largely remained consistent over 
its history. From a normative institutionalist perspective, the exceptionality of Europe makes this 
                                                            
1 Shannon L. Blanton and Charles W. Kegley, “Interpreting World Politics” in World Politics: Trend and 
Transformation, (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2010): 16-17 




particular focus of study not only interesting, but relevant to the study of both identity politics 
and international relations.  
The importance of nationalism in the study of political science, with specific regard to its 
interaction in the regional and global economic systems is exemplified in not only historical 
observations, but the modern geopolitical climate. Sub-state nationalism has been politically 
relevant in virtually every state where it exists, and in many cases has led to substantive domestic 
political changes. Quebec for example has seen its separate national identity fundamentally shift 
the political environment of Canada numerous times in the past 60 years. From the FLQ and 
militant separatism in the 1960’s, to today where the Quebec nationalist party, the Bloc 
Québécois, holds almost ten percent of the seats in Canada’s parliament.4 Although, as 
demonstrated with the example of Canada, sub-state nationalism is apparent in many states, the 
European example is exceptional due to its extensive and complex history. The impact of sub-
state nationalism is of growing importance to the field of political economy and identity studies, 
and this project will provide a useful examination of the fields.  
1.2 - Research Design and Methods 
 This study seeks to answer a single overarching question: does the amount of sub-state 
nationalist sentiment within a state have an impact on the disbursement of intergovernmental 
transfer payments from their respective central governments? This question will be answered 
under a normative institutionalist theoretical framework to understand the power relations 
between the overarching central state government and the sub-state nations which exist within 
the regions of the countries being examined. The research will focus on two European states; 
                                                            




Spain, and the Netherlands. These countries were selected based on the pervasiveness of regional 
sub-state nationalism, with Spain having perceptually high levels in general, and The 
Netherlands having comparatively low levels. Despite these differences, both are unitary states 
which contain at least some amount of regional identity and language groups. This study is 
employing the most-different case study design as a means of comparing the differences in 
variable interaction observed in systems that, while similar in some fundamental ways, are 
largely divergent in critical aspects. 
The analysis will be conducted using the individual regions receiving financial payments 
from their central governments, either through capital grants or equalization schemes as the cases 
for study. The time-series data will also be analyzed separately to highlight any potential trends 
in this data. The selection of the regions being studied are the Spanish autonomous communities 
and the Dutch provinces as both are comparatively equal units of analysis in terms of their size 
and relative populations. The provinces of Spain are not comparable to any regional body in the 
Netherlands, and the municipalities are not particularly relevant to this study. Throughout this 
paper, the term “region” may be used to refer to either a Spanish autonomous community or a 
Dutch province. 
 The study will be conducted based on three specific variables. The dependent variable for 
this study is the amount of transfers received by regional governments from their respective 
national governments (β0). The value of β0 will be comprised of different aggregates for each 
country as explained in Chapter Four. This will then be analyzed against the independent 
variables, which will be the percentage of votes attained by sub-state nationalist parties in their 
respective regional elections (β1) and the relative wealth of the regions (β2). Both of these 
independent variables will be compared to the dependent variable using linear regressions, t 
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tests, and f tests to determine the significance of the variables.5 The data will be analyzed over a 
period of nine years; from 2010 until 2018. The collection will begin in 2010 because that is the 
first year following changes to the Spanish equalization system. Since the Netherlands has not 
made any substantial changes to their system, this year provides a more uniform comparison 
between both countries and would eliminate the variable of legal changes to the system. The 
dataset will end in 2018 as that is the last year where data for both countries is publicly available. 
 The hypothesis (H1) for this study is that a relationship will be observed between the 
dependent variable and both independent variables (β0 = β1 + β2 ≠ 0). The null hypothesis of this 
study is that no change will be observed in the dependent variable when regressed against the 
independent variables (β0 = β1 + β2 = 0).  
1.3 - Limitations 
 The very nature of this study examines the fiscal relationships between regions and their 
national level governments. While historical backgrounds and other intricacies may be briefly 
discussed, they will not be the focal point of this study. Therefore, while some relationships may 
be established, there could be other factors which influence the amount of intergovernmental 
transfers which are not included in this study.6 Furthermore, the study is limited to the cases 
being presented and may not be generalizable to other countries given the highly unique nature 
of many regional-state relationships.  
 
 
                                                            
5 Each procedure will be explained in more detail in the Fifth Chapter. 
6 Other factors may include emergencies requiring central financial assistance to the regions, unique events which 
received one-off central funding, economic distress in a region (or the country as a whole), among others. 
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CHAPTER TWO – REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 – Understanding the Nation 
Prior to defining the scope of the term “nationalism” as it will be operationalized for this 
study, debate on the creation and origin of nationalism and the nation must be explored. Benedict 
Anderson outlines a rather pessimistic view of the concept of a nation, describing it as an 
“imagined community”, both limited and sovereign.7 It is “imagined” because those within it do 
not, and will never know the vast majority of the other members.8  Further, the nation is limited 
in the sense that it is contained within a finite area, and sovereign as nations have slowly 
transitioned from divine hierarchical dynasticism to more direct popular rule.9 Anderson asserts 
that the origins of these imagined communities partially arose from this transition, as many 
during the enlightenment began to seek new meaning for their own mundanity and mortality.10 
This led to the creation of the overall concept of the imagined community, where regardless of 
inequalities or exploitation, the nation is viewed as a community based on “deep, horizontal 
comradeship” that millions of people will kill and die for.11   
One particularly interesting example given by Anderson to illustrate the importance of 
the nation is how early colonizers in the Americas engaged in more cultural than physical 
extermination. The views expressed through the practice of cultural destruction in the Americas 
describe a substantial reverence of the very concept of a nation; if the cultural origins of the 
nation derive from the attribution of meaning to one’s death, then the murder of indigenous 
                                                            
7 Benedict Anderson, “Introduction” in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Revised Edition (London, UK: Verso Books, 2006): 6 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid, 7 
10 Ibid, 11 
11 Ibid, 7 
6 
 
persons would only strengthen their nations.12 The colonizers viewed assimilation and dilution of 
indigenous culture as the primary method for eliminating existing nations on the continent. This 
is fundamentally important for understanding contemporary nationalism, especially as it relates 
to the historical conflict between many state and sub-state actors and the development of regional 
identities. 
An opposing view to this was famously proposed by Anthony D. Smith through his 
examinations of the origins and development of nations and identities. His view focuses on the 
historical and cultural developments which lead to the creations of identities and the various 
elements which comprise an overarching national identity. Smith underscores the plurality of 
factors by highlighting how, in some cases such as with Germany and Switzerland, religion may 
divide otherwise similar ethno-linguistic populations.13 Using the example of ancient Greece, 
Smith demonstrates that different types of identity can exist – and in fact often coexist within a 
society. While there was no formal “Greek” nation, there was a Greek community which was 
comprised of culturally and linguistically Hellenic peoples irrespective of their legal status 
within their different city-states.14  This duality is commonly understood as the difference 
between civic and ethnic nationalisms.  
To Smith, the civic model of a nation is a fundamentally western conception based 
primarily on the spatial and territorial element.15 Not only must the territory be clearly 
demarcated, but it must have historic linkages to those who inhabit it while being culturally 
significant.16 A civic nation must also possess what Smith denotes as a patria; common political 
                                                            
12 Ibid, 14 
13 Anthony D. Smith, “Introduction” in National Identity (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1991): 7 
14 Ibid, 8 




institutions and wills representing those inhabitants of the aforementioned lands, such as was 
observed with the unification of the provinces of the Netherlands to defend against Habsburg 
rule in the late 16th century.17 Similarly, the nation must also guarantee common legal rights to 
its inhabitants which represent common values among the population.18 While the civic model of 
the nation is more conceptually relevant for the analysis of variables in this study, the ethnic 
conception of the nation remains relevant . 
The “non-western” model of the nation differs principally in the emphasis placed on 
native culture and one’s birth into it.19 Unlike in the civic model, individuals cannot choose the 
nation to which they belong – even if one emigrates from the physical nation, they will remain 
irrevocably linked to their ethnic nationality.20 Smith argues that the laws are typically less 
important than language, custom, and culture in ethnic nations.21 Instead, the community is 
motivated by shared histories and myths in their national aspirations, making society more 
susceptible and enticing for populist leaders.22 In his analysis, Smith does recognize that these 
are more general theories which cannot be applied entirely to every situation, and states that all 
nations have, to varying degrees, elements of both ethnic and civic models.23 This blend 
typically will contain the following: historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a 
common culture, uniform legal rights and duties for members, and a common economy with 
territorial mobility.24 These elements are critical to understanding the composition of a nation, 
and perhaps even more so to understanding the operation and development of sub-state nations. 
                                                            
17 Ibid, 10 





23 Ibid, 13 
24 Ibid, 14 
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This construction of the nation also imparts credibility to the idea that state institutions have the 
ability to fundamentally transform the identities contained within them and conversely the 
nation’s ability to alter the state’s behaviour.  
2.2 – Nationalism 
The overall sentiment of nationalism as it is contemporarily understood is divergent from 
its theoretical origins. Nationalism is beyond merely an affinity towards one’s nation as could be 
understood from Anderson or Smith. While there are varying degrees to the intensity of the 
expression of nationalism, in their article examining identity in a united Germany, Blank and 
Schmidt provide an excellent umbrella to understand the concept of modern nationalism. The 
authors note that nationalism (and its degrees of intensity) is a form of expression of one's 
national identity.25 Nationalism is a primarily staunch support of one's nation which often rejects 
ambivalent or negative opinions of it.26 Nationalism can also be exclusionary, holding a 
perception that members of said group have unique qualities of superiority. This can but does not 
always result in the derogation of members of outgroups based on these feelings.27 Such 
sensitivities fit more closely with Smith’s definition of ethnic nationalism, as it leaves less room 
for mobility and inclusion.   
 While this definition can be considered as encompassing, albeit at a rather basic level, the 
current popular definition of nationalism, it does not necessarily represent the concept of sub-
state nationalism which will be applied to this study. The aforementioned article includes the 
possibility for the expression of nationalism to varying intensities. Dekker et al expand on this by 
                                                            
25 Thomas Blank and Peter Schmidt, "National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An 
Empirical Test with Representative Data," Political Psychology 24, no 2 (June 2003): 291 
26 Ibid, 292 
27 Ibid, 294 
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propounding that the expression of nationalistic tendencies functions as a hierarchy, with 
positive and negative types, as well as intensity of expression.28 They also differentiate between 
different focuses of nationalistic tendencies, such as regional-national pride, European pride, and 
internationalism.29 This article also lays a useful foundation for the definition of sub-state 
nationalism. This phenomenon occurs when individuals have a positive attitude from one focus 
(regional pride, for example) and a negative focus from another, such as national pride.30 The 
example given in the article is Basque regional nationalism with negative attitudes toward 
Spain.31 Therefore, sub-state nationalism can be understood as positive attitudes toward one's 
specific region which exist simultaneously with negative feelings toward the higher state-level 
nation. What might cause these negative feelings will of course differ between cases, and even 
individuals. The intensity of them will also vary between each. Further, it is also possible for 
those with stronger regional identities to not have negative feelings towards other levels of 
identity but simply for their feelings towards their region to be more positive or intense than 
others.   
 What must be further be understood for the scope of this study is that sub-state 
nationalism is not necessarily linked with ideals and goals of separatism from their governing 
national sovereign. In many cases, the dominant sub-state nationalistic rhetoric centres around 
complex redefinitions of sovereignty, representation, and recognition within the state.32 Within 
the current international system, sub-state nations are becoming more interested in playing roles 
                                                            
28 Henk Dekker et al, "Nationalism and its Explanations," Political Psychology 24, no 2 (June 2003): 347 
29 Ibid, 348 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid, 349 
32 Stephen Tierney, "Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the 
Nation-State ," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54, no 1 (January 2005): 162 
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of greater importance, with special regard to international organizations.33 Such changes bear 
relevance to potential future studies given the relevance of the EU in domestic European politics. 
Taking on an increasingly supranational role, the EU is gradually shifting the very paradigm of 
European governance to a post-Westphalian model that emphasizes to a greater extent the 
prominence of sub-state nations.34 It is also important for this study because the aim is not to 
assess likelihood of separatism, or how internal funding allocations may interact with desires for 
separation.   
2.3 - Sub-State Nations and Regions 
 The legal distinction between a sub-state nation’s governance and other levels of 
governance are of great importance to this study. As has been already outlined, although the 
significance of a sub-state nation is not limited to its recognition within a state as a legal entity, 
there are many times where they overlap. In many cases, at least in the West (and in particular 
Europe), they take the form of a legal entity at a certain level of government within a state. 
Quebec, Catalonia, Basque Country, Northern Ireland, and Scotland (to name a few) are all 
prominent sub-state nations that have legal recognition as regional entities within their respective 
states. While each region’s legal positioning within their respective states varies with the 
governance system of the country, they all represent a level of government that operates at a 
regional level, which is critical to understanding this concept. 
 Under a system of federalism (which Spain is increasingly moving towards), 
representation is affected through the organization of overlapping social groups and communities 
                                                            
33 Ibid, 163 
34 Ibid, 164 
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that are tasked with electing different, and often competing bodies of representation.35 It can also 
lead to complex, territorially based identities that are a result of tiered governance.36 The result 
of any system that has separate levels of governance (and subsequently different legislatures) is 
the existence of competing interests within the region. Take the example of Quebec which, as 
part of the federal Canadian system, utilizes the powers given to it through its legislature to 
entrench its national identity, culture, and language within its society.37 Quebec’s history is one 
of abundant conflict within the federal system, and it is not alone in this. Catalonia’s identity, 
which has origins long pre-dating most, has recovered from the era of Franco (1936-1975) by 
utilizing its position within the increasingly disintegrating unitary system of Spain to demand 
increased autonomy and internal authority.38  
 Catalonia’s position within the Spanish system is a gleaming example of the separation of 
the identity from the legal, state entity. According to Keating, Catalan nationalism often crosses 
the political spectrum and historically clashes on the bases of class identity.39 As illustrated by 
Hamann, this is a clear demarcation that is necessitated by any tiered system of government that 
creates competing social groups with different interests at the state and regional levels. While 
nationalist parties may have great successes when their popularity is aggregated, there is still 
significant competition between them given the nature of the system they interact in. The 
institutionalization of regional governance on the basis of identity is incredibly important for this 
                                                            
35 Kerstin Hamann, “Federalist Institutions, Voting Behaviour, and Party Systems in Spain,” Publius 29, no 1 
(Winter 1999): 112 
36 Ibid 
37 Michael Keating, “Quebec” in Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia 
and Scotland, (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996): 69 




study, as it not only can play a role in the financing of these systems, but it can fundamentally 
alter the lens through which the concept is examined.  
2.4 – Factors Influencing Intergovernmental Transfers 
2.4.1 – Structure of Government and Constitution 
The governance structure of any two states will be different, and as such will play a role 
in how money is distributed and spent within the country. The decentralization of governance 
varies significantly between states; for example, regional governments in Italy collect no taxes 
from their citizens, but state-level governments in the United States are responsible for 
approximately 48% of all taxation in the country.40 How each state, and subsequently each 
region is governed is a critical factor in whether or not a region will receive payments from the 
central government at all, as well as how much they will receive. Highlighting Canada as an 
example – its internally controversial system of equalization payments between provinces are 
constitutionally enshrined in its federal system.41 In the European context, Germany also has a 
constitutionally mandated system for distributing money to the component states of the federal 
system. In this case. some distribution follows fixed quotas, while certain funds are allocated 
(per the constitution) in an attempt at maintaining equality between states.42 Per Article 107 of 
the German Constitution, there must be financial equalization between state governments to 
ensure relatively uniform living conditions and public services throughout the entire country.43 
German states can also apply for “supplementary central government grants” for special projects, 
                                                            
40 Tim Bale, "From Government to Governance" in European Politics: A Comparative Introduction, (London, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 73 
41 Robin Broadway and Frank Flatters, "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: 
A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," The Canadian Journal of Economics 15, no 4 (November 1982): 614 
42 Deutsche Bundesbank, “The Reform of Financial Relations in the German Federal System”, Monthly Reports 
(September 2014): 34  
43 Ibid, 38 
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which can theoretically create inequality between states so long as the grant is not discriminatory 
in nature.44 These grants are occasionally given to reduce general horizontal fiscal imbalance 
between regions, but are more often distributed in order to directly alleviate the burdens caused 
by the former partitioning of the country into East and West Germany.45  
 While each state is organized differently, and their formulas or methods of calculation 
may vary, the general principle remains the same in that the structure of the government and 
fiscal regulations will play a significant role in the intergovernmental transfer of funds. This is 
notable in both Canada and Germany and is largely applicable to most de-centralized 
governments. Both Spain and the Netherlands, the cases for this study, are de-centralized unitary 
states whose systems of equalization and intergovernmental transfers will be examined more 
specifically in the next chapter.  
2.4.2 – Political Factors 
Despite its constitutional validity in many states, intergovernmental transfer payments can 
create much domestic strife. Within federal systems, equalization is bound to evoke discontent 
from some actors. In Canada this discontent devolved into intergovernmental conflict in 2004, 
with multiple Premiers publicly attacking the federal government.46 While they are not the only 
province who benefits from transfer payments, Quebec was the first province to champion such a 
plan to the federal government.47 The 2004 conflict embodies the intertwining of politics and 
monetary redistribution, as many believe the changes made by the Harper government were an 
                                                            
44 Ibid, 41 
45 Ibid 
46 André Lecours and Daniel Béland, "Federalism and Fiscal Policy: The Politics of Equalization in Canada," 
Publius 40, no 4 (Fall 2020): 570 
47 Ibid, 575 
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attempt at winning seats in the regions that most benefited from alterations to the equalization 
structure.48  
 Once again examining literature on Quebec, it is clear that the level of social programmes 
available to residents positively correlates with their level of nationalism, or at least positive 
identification with the Québécois identity.49 During periods of reduction in federal funding and 
subsequently social development, Quebec saw increased rates and intensity of nationalism.50 
Such a trend would also lend support to the relationship between nationalism and economic 
organization. Similar to what has been observed in Canada, the central government in the UK 
created a regional development agency for Scotland in 1965 almost entirely due to nationalist 
pressures and rising popularity of the Scottish National Party (SNP).51 Ten years later, a larger 
and more comprehensive agency was created, again in response to mounting support for Scottish 
nationalism.52 This demonstrates the role that national and sub-national politics play on the 
structure and formation of institutions and their mandates. 
2.5 – Institutions and the Development of National Identity 
One distinctly pertinent theoretical conceptualization by Michael Keating discusses in 
detail the intertwining of markets, capital, and nationalism. Keating links nationalism with 
capitalism by highlighting that transitions to capitalist economies were often motivated by and 
exercised through the agency of the state.53 One of the principal motivations of nationalism as it 
                                                            
48 Ibid, 581 
49 Daniel Béland and André Lecours, "Sub-State Nationalism and the Welfare State: Quebec and Canadian 
Federalism," Nations and Nationalism 12, no 1 (2006): 83 
50 Ibid, 87 
51 Hubert Rioux Ouimet, "From Sub-state Nationalism to Subnational Competition States: The Development and 
Institutionalization of Commercial Paradiplomacy in Scotland and Quebec," Regional and Federal Studies 25, no 2 
(2015): 114 
52 Ibid 
53 Keating, “Nations, Nationalism and the State,” 11 
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relates to capitalist systems is the ability to provide a common objective and sense of belonging 
to previously disenfranchised or marginalized groups left behind by economic inequality.54 In 
these cases, nationalism is used to counter the disintegrative and fractal nature of capitalist 
economies and fiscal institutions, which outlines how these societal institutions are indivisible 
from the nations and identities operating within them.55   
 Additional theory from Rabindranath Tagore supports this postulation. His theoretical 
approach to nationalism in the west is largely focused on social organization and cooperation 
through economic intentions. As a political movement, Tagore believes that nationalism is 
ultimately designed as a motif of self-preservation.56 It is often connected to the organization of 
economic power, with national groups seeking to secure more resources and benefits from their 
society, which clearly fits within the scope and relevance of this study.57   
In his article on why sub-state nationalism is prevalent in the West, Lecours offers six 
explanations; one of which is that national identity becomes institutionalized through 
decentralized governance of regions.58 With greater autonomy, sub-state nations will receive not 
only increased legitimacy within their populations, but also the ability to create policies and 
discourse which further promotes the idea of a distinct nation.59 A sub-state region which can 
provide for its citizens will further the notion amongst them that they could exist independently 
as a legitimate legal entity. The same can also be said of the reverse; where a lack of recognition 
(of language or autonomy for example) can embolden nationalists within a region, further 
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increasing the prevalence of national identity politics.60 Immigration policy is a specific policy 
which can have an impact on national identities. In some communities, such as Catalonia in 
Spain, internal policies are exclusionary and assimilationist which aim to consolidate and protect 
the sub-state national identity of the region.61 This is especially prevalent in regions whose 
national identity is tied to ethnicity and language, as is the case in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia.  
 The Scottish Development Agency created by the British government in 1975 is an 
example of the intertwining of nationalism and institutions. The institution, created as a purely 
domestic agency, was quickly used to subvert British diplomatic relations and establish offices 
throughout Europe, the USA, and Japan.62 While this effort was short-lived, its controversy did 
bring about a new agency for the express purpose of attracting international economic 
investment into Scotland.63 This example illustrates not only the impact that nationalism has on 
the institutions of the nation and state, but the impact that the institutions have on developing the 
national identity. By utilizing the institutions at hand, Scotland was able to gain greater 
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CHAPTER THREE – COUNTRY PROFILES 
3.1 – The Netherlands 
 Like some countries in Europe, the Netherlands operates as a unitary state whereby the 
central government may create, abolish or reorganize lower levels of government.64 The 
Netherlands, like many states, has a national government (Seated in the Hague), twelve 
provincial governments, and thousands of municipal governments.65 The provinces are governed 
through directly elected provincial legislatures which serve for four year terms.66 Local 
government in the Netherlands depends on the size of the municipality, but all are governed 
through municipal councils comprised of seven to 45 elected members that serve for four year 
terms.67 
3.1.1 – Identities and Consociationalism  
Despite the Netherlands’ historically territorial unity, there have existed, prominently 
since the 1800s, deep societal division on the basis of both class and religious lines.68 The 
principal resolution for such persistent divisions in the Netherlands came in the form of  
consociational democracy.69 This system of governance, coined by political scientist Arend 
Lijphart, does not function on the principle of majority rule but instead requires consensus 
building; often through so called “grand coalition cabinets”.70 These grand coalition cabinets are 
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a piece of the consensus-building puzzle by which there are clear and deliberate efforts by 
competing political elites to stabilize the political system and, by extension, society as a whole.71 
Consociationalism was perhaps the most important factor in the mending and reconciliation of 
societal tensions in the Netherlands, which has since transitioned away from the model.72 What 
truly sets the Netherlands apart from Spain is that these divisions were not based on a separate 
national identity (or identities), but instead almost purely on the basis of class and religion. This 
is a significant difference which has allowed for the continued equal devolution of powers in the 
Netherlands, as well as the continual unity of a territorially based national identity.  
The only notable exception to this is the province of Friesland. This northern littoral 
province is unique in the Netherlands for having its own officially recognized language, though 
Dutch is the dominant language in society and education.73 Nevertheless, Frisian and its dialects 
are still the native language of over half of the provincial population, and nearly 95 percent 
claiming they can understand it.74 In schools, Frisian is taught in the upper years, though since 
education in the Netherlands is centralized there is no truly legal obligation to ensure equal or 
adequate Frisian language instruction in the province.75 There also does exist a Frisian identity 
which bears many similarities to those regional identities in Spain. The sub-state identity of 
Friesland is principally geographic in nature; tied to the sea and the coast.76 Upon its 
incorporation into the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, the perceived peripherization of 
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Friesland has contributed to the development of a unified identity from what was previously a 
broad umbrella of different Frisian identities.77 With shared history, geographic ties, and a 
unique language it is clear how Friesland bears resemblance to the sub-state nations of Spain. 
There is one crucial difference where Friesland deviates from the examples in Spain, which is 
that the shared social history and experiences do not revolve around the attempted repression by 
the modern Dutch state. As a result, there have not been significant pushes by Frisians for greater 
autonomy or full-fledged separatism from the Netherlands. This difference is critical to 
understanding the degree to which nationalism affects decentralization in both the Netherlands 
and Spain. 
3.2.1 – Elections and Regional Parties 
Another significant indicator that sub-state nationalism is not nearly as prevalent in the 
Netherlands when compared to Spain is participation in regional governance. Representation of 
regional nationalist parties in the 2003 Dutch provincial elections demonstrates regional 
nationalism is weak at best, with only 12 of the 763 combined provincial seats filled by sub-state 
nationalist or regionalist parties.78 This trend has not changed in recent years, as the largest of the 
regional parties, the Frisian National Party, only garnered four of a possible 43 seats in the 2019 
provincial election compared to their seven in 2003.79 Furthermore, there are no regional parties 
represented at a national level.80 Aside from Friesland, only six other regional parties received 
above 0.1% of the vote share in the 2019 provincial elections.81 The parties were: Lokaal 
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Brabant, Groninger Belang, Lokaal-Limburg, Partij voor Zeeland, Partij voor het Noorden 
(active in Friesland, Drenthe, and Groningen),82 and Sterk Lokaal (Drenthe).83 Compared to the 
2019 elections, regional parties won a combined 15 seats; three more than in 2003.84 This 
demonstrates a consistently low level of support for regional parties in the Netherlands. 
These low levels of support also ensure that regional parties in the Netherlands have a 
negligible role in policy development both nationally and regionally. This is presented in stark 
contrast with Spain, where the largest Catalan national party alone won 13 seats in the national 
parliament in the 2019 Spanish elections.85 In fact, regional nationalist parties in Spain combined 
for 41 out of the 350 seats (12 percent) in the Spanish parliament.86 It is also clear from current 
data that citizen participation in Dutch provincial elections does not come remotely close to 
regional participation in Spain, which has significantly higher turnout in the elections to 
autonomous community parliaments. For example, Catalonia’s voter turnout has been increasing 
steadily, reaching 82 percent in the 2017 elections.87 Comparatively, the 2019 Dutch provincial 
elections (which are all held simultaneously) saw turnout at a mere 56 percent of eligible 
voters.88 In fact, turnout for provincial elections is about on par with that of elections to 
European Parliament.89 
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3.1.3 – Financial Regulations and Relationships 
Decentralization efforts in the Netherlands began in 1982 and have led to progressively 
more powers being devolved to sub-national authorities.90 Notwithstanding the ongoing 
devolution of powers, the 12 provinces are still the least impactful policymakers in the country.91 
Prior to 1985, local governments in the Netherlands raised only 7% of their revenue themselves; 
leaving about 24% and 69% to be filled by revenue-sharing from the central government and 
specific grants, respectively.92 Revenue sharing in the Netherlands is disbursed through a 
formula taking into account various factors such as a region’s population and relative financial 
need.93 There are, however, no special conditions attached to revenue sharing as is observed in 
the case of grants; that is to say the funds may be appropriated for any project with no strings 
attached from the central government.94 As part of the devolution efforts from the Dutch 
government, specific grants have fallen dramatically while revenue-sharing has become much 
more relied upon.95 Revenue sharing has increased to nearly 40% of local government income in 
2003, while specialized grants fell to approximately 43%.96 This means that, while the 
discretionary funding from the central government is decreasing, the provinces are being 
afforded more powers and freedom to spend their transfers as they see fit.  
 A 2019 report from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands shows that the 
trend of dependency has continued. Combined local government income across the Netherlands 
totaled approximately €103bn in 2019; locally generated revenue comprised only €28.1bn 
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(27.2%) of that, while €73.8bn (71.5%) came from national government transfers.97 Of the EU-
28, The Netherlands ranked 7th highest in terms of non-locally generated income in 2019.98 This 
indicates that intergovernmental transfers are critical to economic development of Dutch regions, 
making the Netherlands clearly viable for this study. 
3.2 – Spain  
Like the Netherlands, Spain is a unitary state which has recently begun an increased 
devolution of powers to sub-national regional authorities. Unlike the Netherlands, however, 
modern-day Spain is comprised of multiple historic kingdoms such as Valencia, Aragon, and 
Castille.99 Following the end of fascist dictatorial rule in the mid-1970s, the Spanish government 
almost immediately began to devolve their powers and competences to the autonomous 
communities; comparable to the provinces of the Netherlands. Under the 1978 constitution, each 
of the 17 autonomous communities boasts a popularly elected parliament and government. The 
powers afforded to them, however, depend entirely on the regions’ negotiations with the central 
government.100 The powers of the autonomous communities can be exercised as they see fit, so 
long as it does not violate the constitution and remains committed to the “indivisible unity of the 
Spanish Nation”.101 It is here where many believe that the Spanish system is unfair, as many 
autonomous communities cannot effectively exercise their rights to the extent that others (such 
as the Basque Country) can. This has created a system dubbed by some experts as 
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“Asymmetrical Federalism”, as some communities objectively have fewer rights than others 
do.102 
3.2.1 – Sub-State National Identities and Separatism 
This “Asymmetrical Federalism” is largely derivative from various contemporary sub-
state nationalist movements, primarily from Basque and Catalonia. These two autonomous 
communities have clear and distinct national identities which have both seen overt secessionist 
movements. For Catalonia, their identity had been repressed significantly during Franco’s rule; 
treated as an outside group within their own country.103 A 2006 statute passed in the Spanish 
lower house codified the Catalan identity within the country, declaring Catalonia a 
“nationality”.104 Although this was a significant step forward to formal recognition, the statute 
was opposed by one of Catalonia’s prominent independence parties, the Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalynya (ERC), on the basis that it did not go far enough.105 Following its approval through 
a Catalonian referendum the statute faced significant opposition from Spanish national parties, 
who ultimately referred it to the country’s Constitutional Court.106 In 2010, the court declared 
some articles of the statute illegal, prompting not only massive protests against the Spanish 
government, but a clear demarcation in discourse and public opinion within Catalonia towards 
the central government.107 This tension was palpable, with demonstrators declaring the 
Constitutional Court “Francoist” and accusing the Spanish government of “robbing [them] of 60 
million Euros a day”.108 
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By 2014, Spain had been labeled by both the Catalan government and civil society 
organizations as an enemy, with prominent independence activists and civil society organizations 
proclaiming the Spanish state as their “adversary”.109 Catalonia has since launched several non-
binding referenda, most notably in 2014.110 This referendum was a result of the Spanish lower 
house rejecting a call from Catalonia for the devolution of powers giving the right to call a 
referendum.111 The referendum (referred to by the Catalan government as a “participatory 
process”) prompted the Spanish Constitutional Court to once again aim its sights on the issue of 
Catalan independence. In its 2014 decision, the court discussed the issue of the so called “right to 
decide” and found that that the constitution provides a right to self-determination only so far as it 
applies to the protected right to freedom of expression.112 In essence, this decision legitimized 
the Catalan people’s rights to decide their political fate but does not provide a legal avenue to 
practically exercise it in order to secede from the Spanish union under the current constitution.113 
On October 1st, 2017, the Catalan government defied the decisions of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court and called a binding referendum on independence which saw an overwhelming 90% 
majority vote to leave the Spanish union.114 The vote was subject to much international attention, 
largely due to the overwhelmingly violent response by the Spanish government in their attempts 
to suppress the vote.115  
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The other most notable example of sub-state national identity issues in Spain comes from 
Basque Autonomous Community. Much akin to the case of Catalonia, the Basque struggles for 
independence and identity did not begin with Franco but were certainly exacerbated during his 
rule.116 Unlike Catalonia, however, the response from Basque nationalist groups was violent; 
amounting to what many people would contemporarily describe as terrorism.117 Most famously, 
the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was an armed Basque nationalist group that used violence in 
an attempt at attaining independence from Spain. The actions of the ETA were directly 
responsible for the deaths of more than 800 people from 1958 until a ceasefire brought upon their 
dissolution in 2011.118 Another key difference between the two is that traditional “Basque 
Country” encompasses more than simply its autonomous community’s namesake; the ETA also 
sought independence of the neighbouring Navarre Autonomous Community and some areas of 
southern France which would then be unified as a single “Basque Country”.119  
These added complexities would theoretically contribute to increased levels of separatist 
sentiment, however quite the opposite has been observed. While Catalan separatist efforts have 
clearly grown in intensity, the same cannot be said for Basque Country.120 In 2014, a study 
conducted by the University of the Basque Country found that only 24 percent of respondents 
had a desire to separate from Spain; down 13 percent from 2006.121 This is in stark contrast with 
what has been seen in Catalonia, where 57% were found to be in support of independence during 
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the same year.122 One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the special economic regime 
that granted the Autonomous Communities of Basque and Navarre broad fiscal independence 
from post-Francoist Spain.123 
3.2.2 – Regional Parties and Elections 
As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, regional elections in Spain tend to be much more 
prominent than in the Netherlands both in terms of voter turnout and in the number of parties 
competing in regional and national elections. Catalonia alone has four regional nationalist parties 
represented in their parliament as of their 2017 election, compared to six across the entire 
country of the Netherlands.124 Where Spain also significantly diverges from the Netherlands is in 
the amount of representation attained by these regional identity-based parties. A large scale 2015 
study by Filippo Tronconi examined regional parties in Italy and Spain and their participation in 
governance. The study found that between 1979 and 2011, identity-based regional parties in 
Spain had the opportunity to form government at the autonomous community level a combined 
144 times.125 What this means is that these parties in Spain were either a part of a governing 
coalition or held a majority in their regional legislatures 144 times in the span of just over 30 
years. This represents a clear differentiation to what has been observed in the Netherlands, where 
such occurrences are generally rare.  
 While representation at the regional level is significant, attaining national recognition is 
vastly more impactful for the promotion and furtherance of regional interests. It is here where 
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Dutch provincial parties are even more divergent from those of the Spanish autonomous 
communities. As previously discussed, there are no regional parties represented in the Dutch 
lower house of representatives, whereas the Spanish lower house sees almost 12 percent of their 
seats occupied by regional identity-based parties as of the November 2019 General Election. 
These parties, represent the six autonomous communities of Catalonia, Basque Country, 
Navarre, Canary Islands, Galicia, and Cantabria, as well as the Aragonese province of Teruel.126 
This representation allows for a direct voice in how the entire country is run, and promotes 
regional concerns more effectively. This is particularly evident in Catalonian negotiations to 
codify their identity in Spanish law, as regional parties played a significant part of the talks. It 
also was especially relevant in the devolution of fiscal powers, especially in the case of Basque 
Country.  
3.2.3 – Fiscal Regulations and Relationships 
The fiscal independence enjoyed by the Basque Country and Navarre is the most enjoyed 
by any autonomous community in Spain. They are able to collect 100% of all taxes (with the 
exception of customs duties), set regional spending programmes, and are reimbursed for the 
VAT collected by the central government in Basque territory.127 The rest of the country, which 
does not fall under this so-called “foral regime”, operate under a specific scheme of tax-sharing 
(referred to as the “common regime); a 50 percent split of personal income tax (plus 
discretionary regional rates) and VAT, along with 58 percent of alcohol, tobacco and 
hydrocarbon duties going to the regions.128 These regions do collect 100 percent of all 
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nationally-set rates (some of which are also subject to additional regional discretionary rates) on 
electricity, oil, property tax, stamps, motor vehicles, as well as wealth and inheritance taxes.129 In 
stark contrast with the Netherlands, Spanish autonomous communities in 2018 raised just over 
40 percent of their own revenues.130 In fact, the Spanish autonomous communities rank second 
amongst EU members in terms of locally generated revenue (including provinces and 
municipalities) behind only the German Länder.131 As a whole, Spanish sub-national government 
spending (including provinces and municipalities) accounted for almost 80 percent of total 
government spending while in the Netherlands, it was about one third.132 
 This was not always the case, as until the early 1980s the vertical fiscal imbalance of the 
central Spanish government was extremely high.133 The issue of vertical fiscal imbalance in 
Spain was easily addressed by implementing the aforementioned taxation and revenue sharing 
schemes, however this cannot particularly address the issue of horizontal fiscal imbalance; where 
there is inequality between the regions themselves.134 Such issues cannot be solved through the 
same mechanisms used to address vertical fiscal imbalances, and in fact are often exacerbated by 
them. This is evident when examining the foral regime communities and their glaringly unequal 
tax burden in comparison to the rest of the country. Residents of Basque and Navarre do not 
share a remotely equal cost of centrally provided services but retain equal access to them 
nonetheless.135 Compounding this is the Ley Organica de Financiacion de las Comunidades 
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Autonomas (LOFCA) which imposes strict regulations on taxation powers of the other 15 
autonomous communities.136 The LOFCA further emphasizes the necessity of intergovernmental 
transfers between the central government and autonomous communities, as their powers are 
largely limited to raise their own revenues. 
 Traditionally, intergovernmental transfers were based on need as determined by a 
formula set out in the LOFCA.137 The actual disbursement of funds, however, was often 
bilaterally negotiated between the Spanish government and each autonomous community 
separately due to the central government’s inability to accurately assess the criteria needed to 
complete the LOFCA formula.138 This was the norm until 2009 when Spain introduced a reform 
which altered the formula slightly by not counting revenue generated through regional taxes in 
the final calculation of assets for equalization.139 This new measure is extremely beneficial for 
autonomous communities that have levied their own taxes – and especially for those who end up 
having a negative transfer balance with the central government. The revision also includes 
various non-fiscal factors such as population density, and whether there is a regional language 
population requiring protection.140 Much like other states that have equalization regimes, the 
wealthier regions still tend to ostensibly bankroll the less fortunate ones in the interest ensuring 
(at least as close as possible) equal access and quality of government services throughout the 
country.  
 Spain, much like the Netherlands, also has a system of grant transfers, which are intended 
to be used for the financing of (often specific) capital projects within a region. In the case of 
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Spain, these transfers are made up of national fund programs such as the “Interterritorial 
Compensation Fund” which all states contribute towards and are then redistributed.141 Also like 
the Netherlands, these grants are generally bilateral and discretionary on the part of the central 
government, which differs from the general-purpose equalization scheme previously 
discussed.142 While these grants are often a small percentage of the total transfer payments to the 
regions, they are significant enough to be discussed due to their discretionary nature. With the 
central government allowed to expressly determine which regions get how much grant money, 
this program is clearly relevant to this study.  
3.3 – Comparability 
While this equalization scheme differs from that which is practiced in the Netherlands, 
the Spanish example is still quite clearly relevant for this study. As has been demonstrated, the 
fiscal powers devolved to the autonomous communities are largely malleable. They can, and are, 
changed to ensure more equity amongst the regions, and as such can also be changed for political 
purposes; the inclusion of regional language factors in equalization payments is a notable 
example of this. Both Spain and the Netherlands operate as unitary states, both have significant 
regional governments (Dutch provinces and Spanish autonomous communities) and both have 
transfer/equalization schemes that comprise the majority of regional revenues. Consequently, 
Spain and the Netherlands are both viable for this study, and a fair comparison can be made 
between the two for the purposes of analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – DATASET AND COLLECTION 
4.1 – Fiscal Data 
 
 The dependent variable for this study is the amount of intergovernmental transfer 
payments from the central governments to their respective regional governments. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, such transfers are almost exclusively legally mandated, though there is 
often flexibility; either through discretionary capital transfers or by amending the laws governing 
such payments. The data has been collected through respective government websites and 
budgetary documents. For both the Netherlands and Spain, the figures represented in this study 
have been taken from data published by the central governments on the financing of regional 
governments. Retrieving data from the central governments ensures that there is uniform 
calculation between the different regions of a country. The wealth of the regions also is included 
as an independent variable for this study to measure more accurately the relative impact that 
intergovernmental transfers have on sub-state nationalism.  
Under the transfer schemes of both countries, the regions with lower relative “wealth” 
should, in theory, receive more in transfer payments than those with more. One of the largest 
factors used in these calculations is a region’s internal revenue generation which usually comes 
in the form of levied taxes. For the purposes of this study, internal revenue generation will be 
used as a proxy value for the relative wealth of a region. This value is most suitable for this study 
due to the fact it excludes external variables and focuses solely on a single institutional factor. 
This proxy value fits within the theoretical framework of normative institutionalism, and 
therefore is fitting to be used in the study. Internal revenue generation is most suitable to 
represent the wealth of a region as it indicates a region’s independent ability to provide services 
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for its population. All data collected from each region in both countries will be represented in 
millions of Euros unless otherwise specified.  
4.1.2 – The Netherlands 
 
 For analysis of the Netherlands, all twelve mainland provinces will be examined given 
that each operates under a common fiscal regime as determined by the central government. 
Overseas territories of the Netherlands will not be included in this study as they do not fit within 
its parameters. Intergovernmental transfers from the central government to the provincial 
governments for the purposes of fiscal equalization are realized through the disbursement of the 
“Provincial Fund”.143 All data on intergovernmental transfers as part of the Provincial Fund were 
taken from the provincial accounts page of the digital archives of the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) of the Netherlands.144 One important factor to reiterate regarding the Netherlands is the 
level of regional decentralization. The Netherlands is still, despite their various devolutions since 
the 1980s, one of the most centralized countries in Europe. Many policies are legislated at the 
national level and their execution is then delegated to the lower levels.145 Between the national, 
provincial, and municipal levels of government, the provinces are by far the weakest in terms of 
both legislative power and capacity to independently generate revenue. The vast majority of their 
funding is through central government grants (general and specific), as no tax-sharing 
programmes are present in the Netherlands.146 This means that both the general-purpose grants 
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(Provincial Fund) and specific grants are funded directly by income generated at the level of the 
central government, and not a redistribution of provincial revenues. 
 One significant variable when discussing intergovernmental transfer payments in the 
Netherlands is the role of the specific grants.147 For the collection of this data, values were also 
taken from the CBS archives of the provincial accounts. For this study, all figures represented 
under the “benefits” column (with some exceptions) of the provincial accounts page will be 
considered as originating from the central government. The exceptions to this are if it is 
otherwise specified that the funds are derived from a different source, or if the origin is unclear. 
An example of this can be found in the function of the “promotion of economic activities”, 
which is explicitly said to contain investment incentives from the European Structural Funds.148 
The decision to include the rest of the figures is the interpretation of the Provincial Fund 
description found in the table information annex of the CBS data, which reads:  
The general payment from the provincial fund, including the pertaining integration 
payments. Benefits not included in the above, such as the specific benefits, are posted to 
the appropriate functions. The additions to provisions (which are / have been made for 
liabilities and risks the size of which is uncertain but can be reasonably estimated) are 
booked to the function for which the provision is made.149 
This passage, in conjunction with research on the funding structure on the provinces of the 
Netherlands, invites an interpretation of the provincial “benefits” to be composed primarily of 
specific grants.150 While this means that the values included in the final analysis may differ 
                                                            
147 An explanation of the calculation for each variable of g can be found in Appendix 1.1 
148 Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018 
149 Ibid 
150 A comprehensive list of provincial functions excluded from the calculation of benefits can be found with 
explanations in Appendix 1.2 
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slightly from the realized figures, it can be reasonably determined as statistically viable for study 
given the nature of the available data and the limited clarity of explanations. The total value of 





 The value of provincial capacity was determined from the same data tables published by 
the CBS, under the “own resources” row.151 This amount is an aggregate of all provincial levies 
collected by the governments, of which nearly the entirety is derived from the “motor vehicle 
surcharge”.152 This value will be represented both as its real value, and per capita.  
4.1.3 – Spain 
 
 For the purposes of this study, the two autonomous cities of Spain, Ceuta and Melilla, are 
not included in the dataset. As a unit of analysis, they do not fit within the parameters being used 
for the study and therefore are being excluded. Furthermore, the autonomous communities of 
Basque Country and Navarre are not included in this dataset due to their unique fiscal policy 
compared to the common regime communities. Basque Country and Navarre are not recipients of 
traditional equalization, and therefore cannot accurately be compared to the common regime 
communities.  
All budget settlement data for the common regime communities was gathered from the 
digital archives of the Spanish Ministry of Finance – Ministerio de Hacienda from the “Reports 
on the Definitive Financing of the Autonomous Communities”. The intergovernmental transfers 
                                                            




for the purposes of equalization are collected and distributed through various funds. Each 
autonomous community’s contributions are determined through certain formulae and 
calculations as determined by Spanish laws. The funds being considered for this study are the 
Fondo Garantia (e1), the Fondo de Suficiencia Global (e2), the Fondo de Cooperacion (e3), and 
the Fondo de Competitividad (e4). From these funds, the net equalization received by each 





The capital transfers received by the autonomous communities are found in budget 
settlement tables provided by the Ministerio de Hacienda. As part of this program, Spain also 
utilizes two specific transfers under the umbrella of the Fondo de Compensacion Interterritorial 
(FCI); the Compensation Fund (c1) and the Complementary Fund (c2).153 This data is found in the 
budget settlement tables under codes 7003 and 7004, respectively.154 While the purpose of these 
funds is the reduction of horizontal fiscal imbalances, they are legally not part of the formal 
system of equalization. They are only distributed to autonomous communities whose per capita 
income level is below 75 percent of the EU average.155 The other value for capital transfers 
comes from code 7009, listed as “Other State Transfers” (c3). From here, the net amount of 
capital transfers to regional governments can be determined (c): 
                                                            
153 Ministry of Finance, “Inter-Regional Compensation Fund,” Government of Spain, March 4th, 2018, 
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154 Ministry of Finance, “Consolidated Data Consultation of the Liquidation of the Budgets,” Government of Spain, 
https://serviciostelematicosext.hacienda.gob.es/SGCIEF/PublicacionLiquidaciones/aspx/SelconsultaDC.aspx,  











(𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐)  
The fiscal capacity of the autonomous communities was determined by adding their 
“settled” tax resources with the “non-settled” tax resources. Settled resources are considered 
personal income tax, VAT, and other shared taxes such as alcohol and tobacco.156 Non-settled 
resources are considered inheritance tax, taxes on donations, gambling tax, and transfer of 
service fees.157 This data was also retrieved from the reports on the definitive financing of the 
autonomous communities. It is this data on fiscal capacity which partially informs the 
calculations for the contributions to, and distribution of equalization transfers. The final fiscal 
capacity is found in Table 2.2.2 of the central government reports. This figure is represented as 
its real value, alongside the value of fiscal capacity per capita. 
4.2 – Data on Sub-State Nationalism 
 
The other independent variable of this study is the amount of sub-state nationalism 
present within a given region of a country. For this study, the amount of sub-state nationalism of 
a region will be represented using support for regional nationalist parties in their respective 
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de régimen común y ciudades con estatuto de autonomía y de las participaciones en los fondos de convergencia 





elections. Ideally, universal survey data would be used to determine this, however such data is 
not accessible and a proxy must therefore be used. Electoral data was operationalized to 
represent sub-state nationalist sentiment by using the percentage of votes attained by regional 
nationalist parties in their respective elections. In Chapter five, supplemental data may be used to 
highlight year-over-year trends, given that elections do not happen every year.158 Consequently, 
the data presented for year calendar year will be recycled for all years until there is a change 
through an election. 
For the purpose of this study, a regional nationalist party is considered to be any party 
which is active in a set region (or regions) which purports to represent regional interests. Not 
included in this definition are those regional parties who are focused on specific issues unrelated 
to the recognition or support of the regional identity. This determination was made through 
verifying the parties’ information on their respective websites. Any party for which this data was 
not clearly available was excluded from this study.159  
4.2.1 – The Netherlands 
 
 The Netherlands runs elections for all seats in the provincial legislatures simultaneously. 
These elections are overseen by the Kiesraad; an advisory committee of the central 
government.160 All data on provincial elections in the Netherlands have been taken from the 
Kiesraad’s website.161 The most recent elections to the provinces were in 2019, and as such fall 
outside of the timeframe of this study. The data used will be from the elections of 2007, 2011, 
and 2015. The 2007 data must be used for this study because it will provide the figures for the 
                                                            
158 Supplemental data includes polling data and voter turnout for regional independence referenda, and regional 
party representation in national legislatures 
159 A complete register of parties included in this study can be found in Appendix 2 




composition of the provincial legislatures as of 2010 – the first year of this study. The 2011 
election will provide data for the same year until 2014, and the 2015 election will cover the 
remainder. These figures do not change year to year outside of the election as there were no 
special elections during the time frame of this study.  
4.2.2 – Spain 
 Unlike the Netherlands, elections to the legislatures of the autonomous communities are 
not administered uniformly by a central authority. Rather, the elections are regulated by the 
Junta Electoral Central (Central Electoral Board) under a framework which creates local 
electoral commissions to administer regional elections.162 The only commonality among the 
autonomous communities is that elections are to be held on or before the fourth Sunday of May 
every four years.163 The exceptions to this rule are in the cases where snap elections are called by 
the presidents of some regional assemblies, which would alter the electoral cycles of the 
respective communities.164 As with the Netherlands, data will remain constant for years where no 
elections took place; only in years where there was an election, planned or snap, will data on 
vote percentages change.  
The parties included in the dataset for each year can be found in Appendix 3. The 
inclusion of a party was based on two factors; the percentage of vote a party received, and its 
ideology. Any party that received less than one percent of the vote in an election will not be 
considered given that such a small presence could logically not exert enough influence to have a 
significant impact on Spanish fiscal policy or intergovernmental transfer payments. The data on 
                                                            
162 LO 5/1985, 21 June, Representation of the People Institutional Act, 10 




electoral results was taken primarily from each autonomous community’s legislature websites.165 
In select cases, data was taken from the Junta Electoral Central publication of results when no 
such data was available from the autonomous communities. 
The ideology of each party was taken primarily from their respective websites, and the 
platforms contained therein. To be included, the party must have clearly displayed a regional 
nationalist ideology prior to the election. This ideology was considered to be present if the 
platforms specifically mentioned protection of a national language, culture, or identity, 
mentioned independence from the Spanish union, or referred to the autonomous community they 
were operating in as a distinct nation. If such information was not present, unclear, or 
unavailable, the party was not included in the dataset for this study. In some cases, the archived 
page of the party in question was used due to ongoing maintenance of the website, or 












                                                            




CHAPTER FIVE - ANALYSIS 
5.1 – Overview 
 
 The collected data was compiled and organized in two different ways for analysis; by 
year and by region. The yearly data includes all regions of a country for a given year, and the 
regional data includes all data for a single region over the nine years being examined. These 
micro-level analyses are relevant to the discernment of specific, individual trends over a case or 
particular year, and can provide insight to which regions or years may stand out as significant in 
the dataset. In addition to the micro-level analyses, a macroanalysis was conducted for each 
country which included all regions across all years. This was done to observe any statistical 
trends which may occur across the country at a broad level.  
5.2 – Methodology 
The analysis was conducted using two distinct statistical functions in SPSS. First, a 
multiple regression was run to test the statistical significance of the relationship between the 
dependent variable (β0) and the independent variables (β1 and β2). The multiple regression was 
run on both micro and macro-level data. The data generated by the regression was used to 
determine statistical significance using t score tests, the value of t being determined by: 




Using the value of t, it was then compared to a standard t score table at the 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, 
and 0.01 levels against the two-sided alternative to determine statistical significance.166 Other 
                                                            
166 The critical values of the t distribution can be found in Appendix 4.1 
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values, such as the adjusted R2 value generated by the regression were additionally used to 
provide increased quantitative certainty and confidence in the data.  
Following the t test, an f test was run to determine the joint significance of the variables. 
This test is critical for understanding the actual relationship between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. The f test acts as a linear hypothesis test and allows for a more 
accurate and definitive assessment of H0 and H1. The f test uses values from the multiple 
regression found in the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table to determine the joint significance 





𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆1





The value of f as determined by the above calculation was then tested against the relevant value 
in the f score table to ascertain the level of joint significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels for 
multiple regressions.168  
5.3 – The Netherlands: Macroanalysis 
 The macro-level data for the Netherlands was run as a multiple regression in SPSS 
against β0 using β1 and β2. The value of β0 is represented as transfers per capita (€) (coded in 
SPSS as TRAN_PC_EUR) from the Dutch government as specified in Chapter Four. The value 
of β1 is represented as the percentage of votes received in provincial elections by nationalist 
parties (coded in SPSS as VOTE). The value of β2 is represented as fiscal capacity per capita (€) 
(coded as FISC_PC_EUR), as specified in Chapter Four. The degrees of freedom for the macro-
                                                            
167 The subscript 1 in the equation denotes the “Regression” row of the ANOVA table, and the subscript 2  in the 
equation denotes the “Residual” row of the ANOVA table. 
168 10%, 5%, and 1% critical values of the f distribution can be found in Appendices 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 respectively. 
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level analysis is represented by the number of cases (n), subtracting one (df = n – 1). In this case, 
the degrees of freedom for the macroanalysis is 107 (120 for the purposes of t score and f tables). 






This table indicates, through interpretation of the adjusted R2 value, that approximately 33.2 
percent of the change in the dependent variable can be explained using both independent 
variables as predictors while filtering out potential coincidental explanations. The output of the 
multiple regression (Table 1.2) indicates the t values of the independent variables.  
Table 1.2
 
The regression output produced a t value of 7.094 for β1, which is greater than the critical 
0.01 value of the t distribution at 120 degrees of freedom (2.617). This indicates that β1 is 
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statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided alternative. The t value of β2 
is 2.696, which is also statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided 
alternative. Using the values of the t test, the null hypothesis can confidently be rejected in this 
case. The results of the regression also indicate relationships between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. In this case, for every unit change in β0 there is a 37.633 unit change 
in β1. Further, for every unit change in β0 there is a 2.032 unit change in β2. These results will be 
analyzed in greater detail in Chapter Six.  
The linear hypothesis test for the macroanalysis using the f test was also completed. This 
test value was found in the ANOVA table (Table 1.3) of the regression output. 
Table 1.3  
 
This table indicates that the f value for this regression model is 27.538. The critical value of f at 
the 0.01 level observed at 120 degrees of freedom with a numerator of 2 is 4.79. The f value is 
significantly greater than the critical value, which means that the null hypothesis can be 
confidently rejected for the macroanalysis of the Netherlands.  
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5.4 – The Netherlands: Microanalysis  
 
 For the first microanalysis, all nine years were regressed separate from each other, using 
the same metrics across all 12 provinces for each year. The results can be cohesively found in 
Table 1.4, where β1 is the change in units of vote percentage per one unit change in the 
dependent variable, and β2 represents the change in units of fiscal capacity per capita per one unit 
change of the dependent variable. 
Table 1.4             Multiple Regressions of Time Series Data for the Netherlands169 
Year β1 t1 β2 t2 f 
2010 13.161 0.912 2.935 0.750 0.653 
2011† 33.667 1.835* 1.721 0.362 1.725 
2012 64.766 4.127*** 6.091 1.446 9.494 
2013 24.157 1.653 6.298 1.487 2.643 
2014 23.194 1.824* 3.408 3.295*** 7.820 
2015† 27.600 1.609 2.834 0.820 1.875 
2016 63.493 4.019*** 2.870 1.027 8.155 
2017 63.918 4.388*** 2.346 1.422 9.657 
2018 27.943 1.789* 1.637 0.978 1.750 
    † Indicates an election year. 
 The microanalysis of the years in the Netherlands demonstrates some statistical 
significance. There were four years of the nine that demonstrated clear statistical significance. 
                                                            
169 * = Statistically significant at the ten percent level 
    ** = Statistically significant at the five percent level  
  *** =  Statistically significant at the one percent level 
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2012, 2014, 2016, and 2017 were the only years where the observed f value was greater than the 
critical value at the one percent level. In three of those four years (2012, 2016, and 2017) the t 
values of β1 were statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided 
alternative. In 2014, the t value of β2 was statistically significant at the one percent level against 
the two-sided alternative. Further, in 2011, 2014, and 2018 the t value of β1 is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent (0.1) level.  
In 2012, 2013, and 2017 the t value of β2 was statistically significant at the 20 percent 
(0.2) level. These values are not within the five percent threshold, but still demonstrate a level of 
statistical significance that merits discussion, especially considering the relatively small sample 
size. 
The second microanalysis regressed all 15 autonomous communities separate from each 
other, using the same metrics across all nine years for each community. The results are found in 
Table 1.5, which uses the same metrics and values as the previous table. 
Table 1.5          Multiple Regressions of Case Data for Provinces of the Netherlands170  
Province β1 t1 β2 t2 f 
Drenthe 56.238 2.099 2.322 2.746* 5.267 
Flevoland   - 2.047 - 2.268 5.142 
Friesland 25.932 0.257 - 7.250 - 0.773 0.310 
Gelderland   -7.805 - 8.032*** 65.506 
Groningen - 171.795 - 2.172 - 13.586 - 1.770 2.360 
Limburg - 26.927 - 0.442 1.640 0.147 0.098 
                                                            





  -10.142 - 2.999** 8.994 
North 
Holland 
  3.310 4.013*** 16.106 
Overijssel   2.831 0.587 0.345 
South 
Holland 
  - 13.585 -1.736 3.015 
Utrecht   3.071 5.126*** 26.274 
Zeeland   -12.608 - 4.236*** 17.945 
  
The microanalysis of Dutch provinces also indicates some statistically significant results. While 
the specific interpretations of this data will be left to the Sixth Chapter, some rudimentary 
interpretation indicates that, using the f test, Flevoland has enough statistical significance at the 
10 percent (0.1) level to reject the null hypothesis. Its β2 value is statistically significant at the 
five percent level against the two-sided alternative, which would also lead to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis.  
Both Drenthe and North Brabant have enough statistical significance at the five percent 
(0.05) level of the critical f value to reject the null hypothesis. Drenthe’s t scores for β1 and β2 are 
statistically significant at the 10 percent and five percent levels, respectively, against the two-
sided alternative. The t value of β2 for North Brabant also indicates statistical significance at the 
one percent level against the two-sided alternative. In both of these cases, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected.  
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Finally, Gelderland, North Holland, Utrecht, and Zeeland are very statistically significant 
at the one percent (0.01) level when testing against the critical f value. In all four cases, the t 
value of β2 is statistically significant at the one percent level against the two-sided alternative. 
This would lead to a clear rejection of the null hypothesis for these case-level analyses.  
5.5 – Spain: Macroanalysis 
 
 The macro-level data for Spain was run as a multiple regression in SPSS against β0 using 
β1 and β2. The value of β0 is represented as transfers per capita (€) (coded in SPSS as 
TRAN_PC_EUR) from the Spanish government as specified in Chapter Four. The value of β1 is 
represented as the percentage of votes received in regional elections by nationalist parties (coded 
in SPSS as VOTE). The value of β2 is represented as fiscal capacity per capita (€) (coded as 
FISC_PC_EUR), as specified in Chapter Four. The degrees of freedom for the macro-level 
analysis is represented by the number of cases (n), subtracting one (df = n – 1). In this case, the 
degrees of freedom for the macroanalysis is 134 (∞ for the purposes of t score and f tables). For 






 The model summary demonstrates the adjusted R2 value for the multiple regression 
against the dependent variable using β1 and β2 and predictors. The adjusted R2 value of the 
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multiple regression would suggest that 61.8 percent of the change in the dependent variable can 
be explained by the independent variables while eliminating any explanations that could be 
explained by chance. The output of the multiple regression that is used to determine the t value 
can be found in Table 2.2: 
Table 2.2 
 
 The output of the multiple regression shows a t value for β1 of 2.094, which is greater 
than 1.960 and less than 2.326, making β1 statistically significant at the five percent (0.05) level 
against the two-sided alternative. The t value for β2 is -14.728; greater than the critical value of 
2.576 which would indicate that β2 is statistically significant at the one percent (0.01) level 
against the two-sided alternative. The results of the multiple regression further indicate that for 
every unit change of β0, there is a 3.754 unit increase in β1 and a 0.776 unit decrease in β2. This 
data independently suggests that the null hypothesis should be rejected (β1 + β2 ≠ 0). However, 
for further validity an f test was run to ensure accuracy and joint significance of the variables, 
and for the purposes of a hypothesis test.   
 The f calculation for the macroanalysis of the Spanish regions was found in the ANOVA 




As a result of this calculation, the value of f can be determined as 108.925. This value is much 
greater than the critical value of 4.61, which would indicate the null hypothesis can be rejected 
well above the one percent (0.01) level. Given the results of the t test and the f test, it can 
confidently be assumed that the null hypothesis may be rejected in favour of H1 when 
performing a macroanalysis of all Spanish regions. 
5.6 – Spain: Microanalysis 
 For the first microanalysis, all nine years were regressed separate from each other, using 
the same metrics across all 15 autonomous communities for each year. The results can be 
cohesively found in Table 2.4, where β1 is the change in units of vote percentage per one unit 
change in the dependent variable, and β2 represents the change in units of fiscal capacity per 
capita per one unit change of the dependent variable.  
Table 2.4                     Multiple Regressions of Time Series Data for Spain 
Year β1 t1 β2 t2 f 
2010 1.723 0.321 - 0.819 - 4.683*** 10.991 
2011† 4.779 0.852 - 0.808 - 4.238*** 9.493 
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2012 3.946 0.746 - 0.801  - 4.305*** 9.765 
2013 2.967 0.505 - 0.887 - 4.198*** 9.074 
2014 2.777 0.565 - 0.840 - 5.111*** 13.526 
2015† 1.657 0.284 - 0.888 - 5.086*** 12.968 
2016 3.194 0.648 - 0.865 - 5.998*** 17.990 
2017 3.963 0.834 - 0.905 - 6.758*** 22.841 
2018 3.644 0.721 - 0.904 - 7.090*** 25.165 
        † Indicates a primary election year across the standard 12 communities. 
The results of the regressions indicate that a relationship between both independent variables and 
the dependent variable exists. However, β1 is not statistically significant at any conventional 
level, whereas β2 across all years is significant at the one percent (0.01) level against the two 
sided alternative. The results of the f tests across all years are each above 6.96, which indicates a 
significant rejection of the null hypothesis for the time-series microanalysis of Spanish regions. 
The second microanalysis regressed all 15 autonomous communities separate from each 
other, using the same metrics across all nine years for each community. The results are found in 
Table 2.5, which uses the same metrics and values as the previous table. 
Table 2.5         Multiple Regressions of Case Data for Autonomous Communities 
Autonomous 
Community 
β1 t β2 t f 
Andalusia 4.498 0.951 0.017 0.103 0.919 
Aragon 12.842 1.854 0.185 1.244 1.801 





-1.791 - 0.287 - 0.147 - 0.696 2.114 
Canary 
Islands 
-7.129 - 0.487 2.417 4.379* 24.723 
Cantabria 33.096 0.895 0.181 0.930 2.529 
Castile and 
Léon 
160.278 2.676* 0.148 0.893 3.868 
Castile La 
Mancha 
  0.084 0.700 0.490 
Catalonia -53.736 - 0.681 -0.304 -1.308 1.939 
Extremadura   0.350 1.370 1.878 
Galicia 3.630 0.617 -0.298 -0.911 0.424 
La Rioja - 23.958 - 0.428 0.040 0.208 0.588 
Madrid   -0.293 -6.049*** 36.588 
Murcia   0.414 1.800 3.239 
Valencia - 5.200 - 0.712 - 0.077 - 0.397 2.870 
 
 The results of the regressions for each autonomous community only produce some 
statistically significant results. For example, in Aragon the t value for β1 is marginally less than 
1.860, which indicates that it is almost significant at the 10 percent level (0.1) and is significant 
at the 20 percent level (0.2) which would lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of 
H1. However, the value of β2 is not statistically significant, and the value of f is not statistically 
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significant, which therefore means the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in this case, or other 
similar cases based on the f value. 
Among the individual autonomous communities, only Asturias (0.1 level), the Canary 
Islands (at the 0.01 level), Castile and Léon (at the 0.1 level), and Madrid (at the 0.01 level), 
have f values that are statistically significant, and would therefore lead to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis based on this test alone. The trends and relationships of this data, contrasted with 























CHAPTER SIX – DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.1 – Discussion of the Netherlands 
 When interpreting the macroanalysis of data from the Netherlands, it appears at first 
glance that there is a significant relationship between the percentage of votes received by 
nationalist parties, the fiscal capacity of a region, and the total amount of transfers received by 
each province. A significant issue with the interpretation in the Netherlands is caused by high 
levels of null data; that is to say provinces with no observed sub-state nationalist sentiment. This 
produces a β1 coefficient of 37.633, which is exceptionally high and likely not fully 
representative of the actual effect observed. While it is still likely that β1 has an impact on β0, the 
relationship itself should be examined using different metrics such as popular opinion polls, 
surveys, or other methodologies to get a clearer picture of the cause and effect.  
 Data on the effect of β2 is likely more accurate and paints a very interesting picture. Over 
the nine years and across all 12 provinces, for every unit change in transfers received per capita 
(€), there is a 2.03 unit increase in fiscal capacity per person (€). This data would indicate that 
provinces with lower fiscal capacity will receive less proportionately than their wealthier 
counterparts. This would prima facie run counter to the generally understood purpose of 
equalization payments, which more often than not tends to see those with less resources benefit 
at a greater rate. However, given that the provinces of the Netherlands have extremely limited 
indigenous revenue streams, the relationship of transfer payments and the wealth of the region 
would likely be unconventional. A significant source of the transfers received by the provinces 
of the Netherlands come from specific grants that are to be used for specific projects; as a result, 
the need varies on a case-by-case basis and it not always tied to the ability of a region to generate 
its own revenue, or its population.  
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 Compounding reliability issues with the data on the Netherlands is the adjusted R2 value. 
At only 0.332 (33.2 percent), only about one-third of the variance in the dependent variable can 
be explained using vote percentage for nationalist parties and fiscal capacity of the provinces. 
While a low adjusted R2 value is not the determining factor in expressing validity of data, this 
number does lend a decreased level of confidence in the results of the macroanalysis.  
 The microanalysis of time series data in the Netherlands produced an observable pattern 
in its statistical significance. In both 2012 and 2016, data concerning the votes for nationalist 
parties was at its highest (with one exception). Both of these years were immediately preceding 
elections to the provincial legislatures. While a causative effect cannot be attributed, this is still a 
significant correlation in the data which cannot be ignored. This data suggests that in the years 
following an election to the regional legislatures, the effect of support for sub-state nationalist 
parties has a more significant impact on intergovernmental transfer payments than other years. 
The only exception noted here was in 2017, which had the highest level of statistical significance 
with a t value of 4.388. While there was no provincial election in this year, there was an election 
to the national House of Representatives.171 This election saw a large boost in the popularity of 
the Partij voor Vrijheid (PVV); a far-right nationalist party with an extreme focus on centralized 
governance.172 While this alone is not sufficient at explaining the increase, it could certainly 
provide one explanation as to why the statistical significance of votes for nationalist parties were 
more significant that year. As with all other data on the Netherlands, a broader study must be 
done to attribute any level of causal implications between these statistics.  
                                                            
171 "House of Representatives March 15, 2017," Database of Election Results, March 15, 2017, 
https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK20170315 
172 "Election Program," Partij Voor De Vrijheid, (2021), https://www.pvv.nl/verkiezingsprogramma.html 
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 The microanalysis of case data in the Netherlands presents highly variable results at a 
case-by-case basis. However, there are some general trends that merit discussion for the purpose 
of this paper. First, among the four provinces that have any levels of sub-state nationalism, only 
Groningen (Figure 1.1) and Limburg (Figure 1.2) have a negative β1 coefficient. This implies 
that for each unit decrease in the number of votes received by nationalist parties, there is an 
increase in the amount of transfers received. In both cases, the data was not statistically 
significant using either the t test or f test. These results still suggest that less votes for sub-state 
nationalist parties could have a positive effect on intergovernmental transfer payments in 








 As can be seen in the above figures, these negative trends are not statistically significant 
due to clear outliers in the data. While the negative relationship is evident, the extreme spread of 
plots on the graph combined with the extremely low adjusted R2 value indicates that no causative 
links can be established in this data.  
Examining those provinces without sub-state nationalism as observed through regional 
elections, the results tend to show high levels of statistical significance in the relationship 
between β2 and β0. First, in Flevoland, Gelderland (Figure 1.3), North Brabant, South Holland, 
and Zeeland there is a negative relationship between the fiscal capacity of the regions and the 
transfers received by the provinces. This indicates that for each unit change in transfers received 
per capita, there is a decrease in the fiscal capacity per capita of the regions. A potential 
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explanatory framework could be established here using conventional equalization logic; the 
lower a region’s capacity to provide services for its citizens, the more money they require from 
their central government. While the relationship itself does not provide causal inference, the 
prevailing logic established in the literature could lend credence to a convincing argument in 
favour of one.173  
Figure 1.3 
 
 Gelderland’s negative relationship is the most statistically significant linear relationship 
among those regions with negative β2 coefficients. Gelderland also has the highest adjusted R2 
                                                            
173 Hikaru Ogawa and Sayaka Yakita, “Equalization Transfers, Fiscal Decentralization, and Economic Growth,” 
Public Finance Analysis 65, no 1 (March 2009): 128 
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value at 0.888 (88.8%) which represents a clear and distinct negative linear relationship that 
allows for confident rejection of the null hypothesis at the one percent level.  
Inversely, Drenthe, North Holland, and Utrecht all had statistically significant positive 
relationships between β2 and β0. These relationships indicate that when the provinces’ fiscal 
capacities increase, so do the amount of transfers received. As with the rest of the data, no clear 
causal inference can be made using this data alone, however a clear, statistically significant 
relationship has been found to exist in this dataset. These findings tend to contradict with much 
of the prevailing literature, which would otherwise suggest that when fiscal capacity increases, 
the grants to regional government should decrease. More focused research should be done on this 
to investigate the results and relationships further.  
6.2 – Discussion on Spain and Comparison 
 The macroanalysis in Spain presents a clear, statistically significant relationship between 
both independent variables and the dependent variable. It suggests that for every unit change in 
transfers received per capita (€), there is a 3.754 unit increase in vote percentage for sub-state 
nationalist parties and a 0.776 unit decrease in the fiscal capacity per capita (€) in the 
autonomous communities. This data is statistically significant enough to confidently reject the 
null hypothesis and demonstrates a clear relationship between the variables. This data also 
appears to provide more realistic values than what is observed in the Netherlands’ macroanalysis. 
One potential statistical explanation for this is the increased sample size for Spain – 135 versus 
108. Another, and perhaps more likely explanation for this, is that Spain has much higher and 
significantly more consistent levels of sub-state nationalism among its regions. In Spain, only 
four out of 15 (26 percent of) autonomous communities had no observed level of sub-state 
nationalism using voting patterns as a proxy. Contrasted to the eight out of 12 (66 percent of) 
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Dutch provinces with no observable level of sub-state nationalism, this could explain the 
considerable deviation between the two countries’ values.  
Considering the same metrics were applied between both countries, the adjusted R2 value 
can provide a good base to make a comparison between the results. In Spain, 61.8 percent of the 
variance in the dependent variable can be explained using percentage of votes for nationalist 
parties and fiscal capacity per capita (€). Contrasted to the value observed in the Netherlands 
(33.2 percent), we can see a clear trend in the data which would indicate that the predictors used 
in both macroanalyses are more effective at explaining the relationship in Spain than in the 
Netherlands.  
The time series microanalysis provides consistent and clear results across all nine years 
of study. In every case, the fiscal capacity per capita (€) was very statistically significant, and 
across all years demonstrated a negative relationship. There was no apparent pattern or trend that 
was observed year over year for β2, however looking at the years of the elections there appear to 
be some minor trends. In 2011, the first year of the dataset where an election was held, the time 
series β1 coefficient saw its highest value at 4.779 and its second lowest β2 coefficient at – 0.808. 
However in the year of the next election, 2015, the β1 coefficient value was at its lowest (1.657), 
and the β2 coefficient value was at its third highest (-0.888). In fact, beginning in 2011, Spanish 
regions saw significant decreases in the β1 coefficient year-over-year, culminating in that lowest 
value in 2015. The value increased significantly in the following year and remained steadily high 
in each following year. This suggests a trend that would certainly require a broader time frame to 
effectively analyze to extrapolate a meaningful pattern; that in the years following an election, 
support for nationalist parties becomes a less meaningful predictor of transfer payments until the 
next election, where it experiences increased significance.  
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The case data microanalysis showed a greater variance between cases, and fewer 
significant trends. Some interesting cases will be discussed however, given their outliers in the 
datasets. For example in Asturias, the vote percentage appeared to be a significant predictor for 
the transfers received per capita (€). While the β1 value appears exceptionally high (77.216), this 
is likely due to two factors; a small sample size, and the region only demonstrating sub-state 
nationalism through the proxy of vote percentage in one year (2010). A visualization of the data 
(Figure 2.1) provides a clear picture of the results that could significantly explain the 
observations of β1. 
Figure 2.1  
 
The simple scatter graph clearly indicates that in the single year that sub-state nationalist parties 
received votes, they received more transfers per capita. A similar trend is observed in Castile and 
Leon (Figure 2.2). While these relationships cannot be considered causative, their statistical 





In some conventionally more nationalistic autonomous communities, notably the Canary Islands 
(Figures 2.3 and 2.4) and Valencia (Figure 2.5), there is generally a negative relationship 
between β1 and β0. There is no statistical significance at a conventional level in any of these 
autonomous communities individually, however it is still notable for two reasons. First, the 
variance in vote percentage between elections is often not extreme. Second, the sample size of 
nine is likely not large enough to provide a statistically significant trend when coupled with the 
generally low variance. A clear relationship between the variables is still present, and in spite of 
its lack of statistical significance merits at least a cursory discussion. Catalonia (Figure 2.6) was 
an exception to the more nationalistic communities, seeing an, albeit statistically insignificant, 





 This visualization of the data in the Canary Islands over the nine-year period of the study clearly 
indicates a trend that when vote percentage for sub-state nationalist parties is higher, the 
autonomous community receives fewer fiscal transfers from the Spanish government. Inversely, 
they are the only autonomous community that has an observed positive β2 coefficient that is 









Table 3.4 represents a highly significant linear model that clearly demonstrates a positive 
relationship between an increase in fiscal capacity and an increase in intergovernmental 
transfers. They are the only autonomous community that saw a highly statistically significant 











This data visualization for Valencia demonstrates, as with the Canary Islands, that when votes 
for sub-state nationalist parties are high, the amount of transfers received by the government tend 
to be much lower. Much like the Canary Islands, the sample size is not large enough to make a 
statistically significant observation, however the trend would indicate that more research could 










The visualization of data for Catalonia demonstrates a positive relationship, though with extreme 
variance of results. Given the tumultuous nature of Catalan-Spanish relations, and the domestic 
political unease in the region, a separate study should be undertaken to examine Catalonia more 
closely.  
One final case in Spain that is worth discussing in Galicia (Figure 2.7). This is another 
region with a generally strong regional identity and language, and a relatively strong presence of 
regional nationalist parties. Unlike other regions which displayed some sort of pattern or trend, 
Galicia’s relationship between vote percentage and transfers per capita is virtually non-existent. 
There is no apparent explanation as to why Galicia appears to differ from other regions, but 
perhaps could be explained through further examination of its history and economic conditions. 
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Figure 2.7  
 
In the case of regions without levels of sub-state nationalism, there was no apparent 
relationship or trends in the data that is statistically significant at conventional levels. As such, 
this aspect of the data will not be examined in depth, however one interesting observation was 
made. Only Madrid had a negative relationship between β0 and β2; for every one unit change in 
the dependent variable there was a decrease of 0.293 units in fiscal capacity per capita. Why the 
other three autonomous communities that did not display any observable level of sub-state 
nationalism demonstrated (albeit statistically insignificant) positive relationships cannot be 





CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 The data collected and analyzed for this study demonstrates that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between sub-state nationalism and intergovernmental transfer payments. 
On average, intergovernmental transfer payments to regional governments increased when 
support for sub-state nationalist parties did as well. What was observed in the Netherlands was a 
positive relationship overall between fiscal capacity of provinces and the transfers received, 
whereas in Spain there was a negative relationship. There is no clear explanation in theory 
surrounding equalization and intergovernmental transfers that would explain the Netherlands’ 
positive relationship between these two variables. As such, this is a gap in the literature that 
could potentially be filled with more research on the topic, as this paper’s scope and limitations 
cannot effectively provide an explanation to this observation. 
The micro-level analyses performed on both countries found some statistically significant 
data. The time series data in both countries tended to coalesce around election years in its 
significance both in terms of dips and spikes in relevance. This trend cannot be explained using 
the data available, nor with any of the prevailing literature on fiscal policy or intergovernmental 
transfers. This is a particularly interesting phenomenon that certainly merits study both in terms 
of increased scope of cases and time. At a case level, contrary to popular wisdom and belief 
Catalonia, one of the most internationally recognizable cases of sub-state nationalism, saw no 
clear trend or statistically significant relationship between intergovernmental transfer payments 
and support for sub-state nationalism. Other traditionally nationalistic regions of Spain such as 
the Canary Islands and Valencia actually saw negative relationships between support for sub-
state nationalism and intergovernmental transfers; the Canary Islands also the only community 
that saw transfers increase clearly with fiscal capacity.  
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Overall, there is significant and interesting data that has come from this study. Some clear 
macro-level trends reinforce existing literature, especially regarding Spain. The data also 
highlights a gap in the literature, specifically when examining the Netherlands and their positive 
relationship between fiscal capacity and intergovernmental transfers. This study therefore 
provides the basis of potential future research on this subject that might be able to fill said gap; 
either by examining the Netherlands more in depth or studying other unitary states where 
regional governments have limited revenue-generating power. For the micro-level data, the data 
was, in many instances, statistically significant. This could also lend itself as an introduction to 
further research to perhaps lend causative explanations for the trends observed in this study, or to 
expose new trends as the years progress and political landscapes shift.  
 The limitations of the relatively short time frame and limited availability of data and 
resources presented an impediment to the ability to make causative arguments in this study. 
However, the statistical significance and clear relationships present within the data suggest that 
this research should act as a stepping-stone to further studies on this topic. While the paper does 
fill some gaps, a significant amount can and should be explored in much greater detail through 
further studies using a broader time frame, expanded set of predictors, and greater resources to 
provide answers to some of the results found here. These limitations, if overcome, would likely 
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 Appendix 1.1 – Exclusion of Provincial Functions Benefits 2010-2016 (NL) 






Organization Municipal relations General Management g10 
Financial Supervision Municipal relations General Management g11 
Qualitative 
Groundwater and Soil 
Management 
Municipal relations Environmental Management g12 





Agricultural Affairs g13 
Utilities Private corporation Economic and Agricultural Affairs g14 
Urban Renewal Municipal Relations Spatial Planning and Public Housing g15 
 








Management (m) General Management g1 g1 = m – g10 – g11 
Total Public Order 
and Safety (p) 
Public Order and 
Safety g2 g2 = p 
Total Traffic and 
Transport (t) Traffic and Transport g3 g3 = t 
Total Water 




Management g5 g5 = e – g12 
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Total Recreation and 
Nature (r) 
Recreation and 
Nature g6 g6 = r 




Agricultural Affairs g7 g7 = a – g13 – g14 
Total Wellness (l) Welfare g8 g8 = l 
Total Spatial Order 
and Public Housing 
(h) 
Spatial Planning and 
Public Housing g9 g9 = h – g15 
 
Appendix 1.3 – Grant Transfer Variables 2017 and 2018 (NL) 
Function and Variable Function Classification Dataset Code 
Total General 
Administration 
General Management g1 
Total Traffic and Transport Traffic and Transport g2 
Total Water Water Management g3 
Total Environment Environmental Management g4 
Total Nature Recreation and Nature g5 
Total Regional Economy Economic and Agricultural 
Affairs g6 
Total Culture and Society Welfare g7 





Appendix 2.1 – Regional Parties in The Netherlands from 2007-2010 
 
Appendix 2.2 – Regional Parties in the Netherlands from 2011-2014 
Region Parties Included in Datasets FY12-FY16 
Drenthe OPD 
Flevoland None 




North Brabant None 
North Holland None 
Overijssel None 






                                                            
174 Onafhankelijke Partij Drenthe. “OPD.” Accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.opd.nl/ 
175 Partij voor het Noorden. “The Origin of the Party for the North,” accessed March 4th, 2021, 
https://www.partijvoorhetnoorden.nl/partij/de-oorsprong-van-de-partij-voor-het-noorden/ 
176 Frisian National Party, “About the Frisian National Party,” accessed March 4th, 2020, 
https://www.fnp.frl/frysk/fnp-fryslan/fryske-nasjonale-partij/ 
177 Partij Nieuw Limburg, “PNL Election Program,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 4th, 20201, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20051219230236/http://www.partijnieuwlimburg.nl/pages/pr ogramma.htm 
178 Provinciaal Belang Fryslan, “About,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.provinciaalbelangfriesland.nl/de-
partij/ 
Region Parties Included in Dataset 2010 
Drenthe Onafhankelijke Partij Drenthe (OPD)174, Partij voor het Noorden 
(PVN)175 
Flevoland None 
Friesland Fryske Nasjonale Partij (FNP)176, PVN 
Gelderland None 
Groningen PVN 
Limburg Partij Nieuw Limburg (PNL)177 
North Brabant None 
North Holland None 
Overijssel None 







Appendix 2.3 – Regional Parties in the Netherlands from 2015-2019 
 
 
Appendix 3.1 – Regional Parties in Spain (2010) 
Autonomous 
Community Parties Included in Dataset Electoral Period (Years) 
Andalusia Andalusian Party (PA)180 2008-2012 
Aragon Aragonese Party (PAR)
181, Aragonese 
Union (CHA)182 2007-2011 
Asturias Asturian Party (PAS)183 2007-2011 
Balearic Islands Unio Mallorquina (UM) 2007-2011 
Canary Islands Canarian Coalition184, New Canaries185 2007-2011 
Cantabria Regionalist Party of Cantabria (PRC)186 2007-2011 
Castile – La Mancha None 2007-2011 
Castile and Leon Leonese People’s Union (UPL)187 2007-2011 
                                                            
179 Lokaal-Limburg, “Local Limburg,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://lokaal-limburg.nl/lokaal-limburg/ 
180 Andalusian Party, “Nacional Andalucista,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 4th, 2021, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150214050113/http://nacional.andalucista.org/ 
181 Aragonese Party, “Our Party,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://www.partidoaragones.es/nuestro-partido/ 
182 Aragonese Union, “History,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.chunta.org/somos/nuestra-historia/ 
183 Asturian Party, “Principles and Objectives,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://asturianista.es/ 
184 Canarian Coalition, “History and Ideology,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://coalicioncanaria.org/historia-e-
ideologia/ 
185 New Canaries, “About us,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 4th, 2021, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180720155535/http://www.nuevacanarias.org/index.php/Quienes-
Somos/quienessomos.html 
186 Regionalist Part of Cantabria, “About us,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://prc.es/prc.php/web/quienessomos 
187 Leonese People’s Union, “About us,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.upl.es/quienes-somos/ 







North Brabant None 
North Holland None 
Overijssel None 






Convergencia I Unio (CiU), Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)188, 
Catalan Solidarity for Independence 
(SI)189 
2010-2012 
Extremadura None 2007-2011 
Galicia Galician National Bloc (BNG)190 2009-2012 
La Rioja Riojan Party (PR)191 2007-2011 
Madrid None 2007-2011 
Murcia None 2007-2011 
Valencia Valencian Nationalist Bloc192 2007-2011 
Rows in italics indicate elections outside the regular timeframe 
 
Appendix 3.2 – Regional Parties in Spain (2011-2014) 
Autonomous Community Parties Included in Dataset Electoral Period 
Andalusia PA 2008-2012 
Aragon PAR, CHA 2011-2015 
Asturias None 2011-2015 
Balearic Islands Convergence for the Isles
193 
(CxI) 2011-2015 
Canary Islands Canarian Coalition, New Canaries  2011-2015 
Cantabria PRC 2011-2015 
Castile – La Mancha None 2011-2015 
Castile and Leon UPL 2011-2015 
Catalonia CiU, ERC, SI 2010-2012 
Extremadura None 2011-2015 
Galicia BNG 2009-2012 
La Rioja PR 2011-2015 
Madrid None 2011-2015 
Murcia None 2011-2015 




                                                            
188 Esquerra Republicana, “What we are,” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.esquerra.cat/ca/que-som 
189 Catalan Solidarity for Independence, “Sectoral Proposal,” accessed March 4th, 2021, 
http://www.solidaritat.cat/pagina/propostes-sectorials/ 
190 Galician National Bloc, “Principals, Ideologies, and Values of BNG,” accessed March 4th, 2021, 
https://www.bng.gal/estaticas/principios-do-bng.html 
191 Riojan Party, “Ideology,” accessed March 4th, 2021, http://www.partidoriojano.es/ideologia/ 
192 Valencian National Bloc, “Who are we?” accessed March 4th, 2021, https://bloc.compromis.net/info/qui-som/ 
193 “The Formation of the Jaume Font and Josep Melia is called Proposta per les Illes,” El Mundo,  February 11th, 
2012. Accessed March 4th, 2021, https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/11/02/baleares/1351874489.html 
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Appendix 3.3 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2012 
Autonomous Community Parties Included in Dataset Electoral Period 
Andalusia PA 2012-2015 
Catalonia CiU, ERC-Cat Si
194, Popular 
Unity Candidacy (CUP)195, SI 2012-2015 
Galicia BNG 2012-2016 
 
Appendix 3.4 – Regional Parties in Spain (2015-2018) 
Autonomous Community Parties Included in Dataset Electoral Period 
Andalusia PA 2015-2018 
Aragon PAR, CHA 2015-2019 
Asturias None 2015-2019 
Balearic Islands 
More for Mallorca196, 
Proposal for the Isles (El Pi), 
More for Menorca197 
2015-2019 
Canary Islands Canarian Coalition, New Canaries  2015-2019 
Cantabria PRC 2015-2019 
Castile – La Mancha None 2015-2019 
Castile and Leon UPL 2015-2019 
Catalonia Together for Yes (JxSi)
198, 
CUP  2015-2017 
Extremadura None 2015-2019 
Galicia BNG 2012-2016 
La Rioja PR 2015-2019 
Madrid None 2015-2019 
Murcia None 2015-2019 
Valencia Valencian Nationalist Bloc 2015-2019 
 
Appendix 3.5 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2016 
Autonomous Community Parties Included in Dataset Electoral Period 
Galicia In Tide (EM)199, BNG 2016-2020 
 
                                                            
194 Re-named ERC party – source remains the same 
195 Popular Unity Candidacy, “Home,” accessed March 6th, 2021, https://perguanyar.cat/ 
196 More for Mallorca, “Who are we,” accessed March 6th, 2021, https://www.mespermallorca.cat/el-nostre-
projecte/qui-som/ 
197 More for Menorca, “Who are we?” accessed March 7th, 2021, https://www.mespermenorca.cat/ca/inici/ 
198 Together for Yes, “About us,” Wayback Machine, accessed March 7th, 2021, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160916035051/http://www.juntspelsi.cat/qui_som?locale= es 
199 In Tide, “Basic Principles,” accessed March 10th, 2021, https://enmarea.gal/principios-basicos/ 
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Appendix 3.6 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2017 
Autonomous Community Parties Included in Dataset Electoral Period 
Catalonia* JuntsxCat200, ERC-CatSi, 
CUP 
2017-2021 
*Election was called due to attempted secession from the Spanish union – Catalan legislature was dissolved by the 
Spanish government 
 
Appendix 3.7 – Autonomous Communities with Electoral Changes in 2018 
Autonomous Community Parties Included in Dataset Electoral Period 




















                                                            
200 Reformation of Juntsx Party that participated in the 2015 election. 
201 Adelante Andealucia, “Election Program,” accessed March 10th, 2021, https://adelanteandalucia.org/epigrafe/00/ 
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